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Recommendations
The EU’s external energy policy –
an external dimension of the EU common energy market
Energy policy is currently one of the EU’s sectoral policies. Its external
dimension is aimed at fostering the achievement of sustainability, com-
petitiveness and the security of supply. In the context of relations with
third countries the EU external energy policy is at present focused on:
– ensuring stable energy supplies at competitive prices and (often in re-
lation to this)
– seeking to reform the energy markets in neighbouring countries in or-
der to harmonise them with the EU market.
This reconciliation of the effectiveness of external actions with the attain-
ment of the objectives of increased self-sufficiency and energy efficiency
remains the key challenge for the EU’s external energy policy.
The use of the integrated energy market
as an instrument of the EU’s external energy policy
Due to difficulties in developing instruments regulating co-operation with
several partners (e.g. Russia), the key role in the EU’s external energy po-
licy is currently played by the internal market and EU acquis. The libera-
lisation and integration of the internal market is one of the fundamen-
tal elements of increasing the EU’s energy security and self-sufficiency.
It also constitutes a factor affirming the EU’s credibility in relations with
third countries. The EU’s internal regulations enforce the modification of
the modes of functioning in the EU for third country companies (mainly
producers). In parallel, the export of the EU model of the energy market
and standards is becoming a basic tool in collaboration with the EU’s
neighbours. However, the effectiveness of the internal market as an instru-
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ment is restricted by several factors including the divergent interests of
EU countries and a part of activities undertaken by European companies.
The definition of priorities and interests
with regard to specific partners or energy projects
The priority area for the EU’s external energy policy is the promotion of
EU regulations and standards in the European neighbourhood. However,
the lack of clearly defined specific objectives and interests for the EU tends
to be problematic. This can be observed in EU-Ukrainian co-operation.
It is not certain how the fading importance of Ukraine as a transit country
bears impact on the EU’s objectives and the possibilities of undertaking
actions in Ukraine. Consequently it is not clear what the EU’s specific
aims are with regard to the Ukrainian gas sector and the future of the
Ukrainian gas network.
The identification of general priorities, the concrete interests and problems
of EU partners would therefore be of key importance for the success of
the EU’s own energy policy. In this context it would be particularly im-
portant to answer the question about the possible benefits stemming
from energy co-operation with the EU for its partner countries (which
could e.g. be the development of solutions for increasing energy efficiency,
adapted to the needs of post-Soviet states, or know-how on developing
alternative energy sources crucial to energy exporters).
The development of bilateral energy relations
as part of the EU’s overall political and economic offer
EU bilateral energy relations need to be pursued within broader package
agreements. An example of an approach is the inclusion of energy ques-
tions in the overall framework for economic co-operation with the EU
(as seen in the cases of North African countries and Ukraine). In the long
term perspective, however, the effectiveness of cooperation is contingent
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upon the attractiveness of the EU’s economic and political offer. Without
a tailored, country specific approach and flexible instruments backed by
consistent foreign policy, the EU will not achieve its energy policy objec-
tives.
The strengthening and promotion of the Energy
Community
The European Commission (EC) is now seeking to extend the multilateral
co-operation framework to the greatest number of countries possible
from the EU’s neighbourhood. Such a single framework would form
a cohesive basis for the achievement of the EU’s objectives. The Energy
Community seems to be the best instrument EU has to reform and inte-
grate its neighbours’ markets.
However, both the Energy Community and the whole concept of export-
ing the EU’s energy market model have their limits. Given the ideas to
extend the Energy Community to more Eastern and Southern EU neigh-
bours, it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of this instrument inter
alia by defining a limited number of targets with regard to each member,
adjusting action plans to the specifics of each country and developing
ways to enforce commitments.
The involvement of the EC and the Member States
The EU’s energy policy often falls victim to EU member states favouring
bilateral agreements with external partners to the detriment of the inte-
rests of the EU as a whole. No sudden change in this may be expected.
Therefore the EU should set up common rules and a legal and institutio-
nal framework which would encourage the cohesion of a global EU poli-
cy oriented towards key partners or strategic projects and which would
clearly specify the EC’s role within it. Currently, the attempt to elaborate
such rules is visible in the EC’s engagement in developing the imple-
mentation rules for the gas liberalisation directives with regard to third
O S W 7
country companies and the EC’s participation in bilateral gas negotia-
tions between new Member States and Russia. It would be important to
institutionalise the formula for consultations and the exchange of infor-
mation between states, companies (holding negotiations with suppliers)
and the EC. The provision from the conclusion of the European Council
of February 2011 that urges EUMember States to inform the EC about both
new and existing energy agreements with third countries may prove to
mark the beginning of such an institutionalisation1.
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Introduction
For many years the European Union has been improving the efficient use
of energy resources and yet the demand for energy in the EU continues
to increase. When Europe belonged to one of the world’s key energy mar-
kets with relatively easy access to energy resources, growing energy needs
were not seen as a source of concern. Today, however, as the competition
for energy resources is intensifying and the global position of the EU ener-
gy market is being challenged by growing economies in the developing
countries, above all China and India, the EU needs to adopt bold policies
to guarantee the sustainable supply of energy. The goal of establishing
a common and effective EU external energy policy based on the principles
of the internal energy market, i.e. competitiveness and transparency, is
therefore becoming a necessity.
In the coming decades the EU’s external energy policy will be developed
against the background of the ongoing changes on the global energy
market. The larger availability of LNG or the soaring production of non-
conventional gas in the US may fundamentally change the landscape of
the European gas market in the coming decade. The unstable situation
in North Africa and part of the countries in the Middle East (and, earlier,
the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis) raise in turn essential questions about
the EU’s future relations with suppliers; the integrity of EU policies and
instruments in the neighbourhood as well as the cohesion and functio-
nality of the internal EU market (including crisis prevention instruments).
Furthermore, the collapse of the Fukushima nuclear power plant and the
resultant fears over nuclear energy may lead to some deeper changes with
regard to the EU strategy of a low-emission economy, e.g. turning away
from nuclear power and opting for gas instead.
Thus far EU energy policy has been to a large extent shaped by lessons
learned, which is especially visible in crisis situations (as is proven by the
developments following the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and
2009 or the impact of the catastrophe at the Fukushima nuclear power
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plant). A lot of the instruments which were being created or the applied
modes of operation have to date been case-specific; sometimes they were
created as precedents.
This report argues the EU needs to develop a fully-fledged external energy
policy; i.e. a common, coherent, strategic approach that build bridges
between the interests and needs of the EU integrated energy market on
the one hand and supplier countries on the other. The geographical area
of the present analysis focuses upon the EU neighbourhood: countries of
the new Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and of the East-
ern Partnership, the Western Balkans, and Russia.
This analysis consists of four sections:
The first portrays the position and role of the EU energy market on a glo-
bal scale. The second section focuses on internal factors shaping the pro-
cess of the development of the EU’s external energy policy. The third sec-
tion illustrates the EU’s relations with its external partners: Russia as
a strategic partner; Ukraine, as the most important transit country and
the key Eastern partner, the Southern Corridor as the priority infrastruc-
ture project outside the EU; and North Africa as an example of current
serious challenges the EU is facing in its external energy policy. The final
part of this report recapitulates the most important challenges.
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I. The EU’s present and future demand for energy
in the global context
The EU is one of the leading energy consumers worldwide2 and one of
the more attractive energy markets (due to its relative internal stability
and predictability and still favourable prices). The EU’s primary energy
production has been falling, which is caused among other factors by the
combination of finite and depleting indigenous resources with a restric-
tive environmental policy hampering coal, alternative gas, and offshore
oil exploitation. An increasing part of the EU’s energy demand is there-
fore met by external supplies. The EU is the key importer of energy re-
sources globally3 and its import dependency has been growing in recent
years (in the case of oil it reached over 90%, with natural gas – approxi-
mately 64%, and with coal – 40%4. Given the strong geographical concen-
tration of energy resources, the EU remains dependent on several sources
of supply. The key source of oil is the Middle East and OPEC countries but
the largest single oil supplier to the EU is Russia5. Russia is also the largest
supplier of natural gas to the EU, before Norway and Algeria6 and coal (Co-
lumbia and the Republic of South Africa follow Russia7) and the second
largest – after Australia and before Canada – source of uranium8. The EU’s
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2 In 2009 the EU was the second – after the US – gas and oil consumer, the fourth consu-
mer of coal and the greatest consumer of uranium worldwide; data quoted from the IEA
statistics of 2010 and the World Nuclear Association.
3 In 2009 it was the largest gas and coal importer and the second oil importer after the US;
data quoted from IEA statistics of 2010 and the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010.
4 Data from the publication of the EC, EU Energy Trends to 2030 – update 2009.
5 According to the EU Market Observatory, in 2010 OPEC countries accounted for approxi-
mately 35% of EU imports, whereas approximately 30% of oil was imported from Russia.
6 According to Eurostat, in 2009 33% of gas imported by the EU came from Russia, 29%
from Norway, 15% from Algeria.
7 In 2009 the three countries accounted for 64% of external supplies of coal according to
the Directorate-General for Energy (European Commission).
8 According to the IAEA, in 2009 these three countries accounted for over 60% of EU
imports (Australia – 22%, Russia – 20% and Canada –19%).
neighbourhood is hence vital as a source of gas – approximately 75% of
EU imports came from this area; and oil – approximately 55% of imports.
The rate of growth in the EU primary energy demand has been limited for
several years by the policy of enhancing energy efficiency, the increased
use of renewable energy sources (RES) and the policy of climate protection
and restrictions on GHG emissions (the 20/20/20 targets). This has been
contributing to a gradual fall in the EU’s demand for oil and coal. Due to
the changes occurring on the European and global markets (non-conven-
tional sources of hydrocarbons and a greater availability of LNG) fore-
casts regarding the development of the EU’s demand for energy and its
import needs in the coming decades vary widely. The most cautious sce-
narios assume a continuation of the current trends and foresee a further
decline in EU demand for coal and oil by 2030 (respectively by 9% and 8%)9,
a relatively steady demand for nuclear energy and RES and an increase
by as much as over 11–19% in the demand for natural gas10. On the other
hand, the boldest scenarios for the EU that envisage intensified efforts
to limit emissions and increased energy efficiency predict a decisive de-
crease in the EU’s demand for hydrocarbons within the next two decades
– by up to 60% in the case of coal, by over 30% in the case of oil and by
over 10% in the case of natural gas, accompanied by a sharp rise in the
demand for nuclear energy (by approximately 44%) and above all for RES
(by up to 180%)11. For more information see Appendix.
The decline in the EU demand (or, as in the case of gas – the decline in
the speed of the growth of demand) will be accompanied by an even more
rapid decrease in the primary energy production, which will contribute
to both an increased import dependency of the EU12 and in certain cases
– the volume of imports. This will be particularly visible in the case of
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9 See the EC, Baseline Scenario with EU Energy Trends to 2030 – update 2009.
10 See IEA Current Policy Scenario, WEO 2010.
11 See IEA 450 Scenario, WEO 2010.
12 According to the EC (2009), the dependence on imports will rise in the case of oil to up
to 100%, gas – up to approximately 80% and coal – up to approximately 50%.
natural gas, the import of which may grow by 2030 by as much as 24%
in comparison to current volumes13. The EU’s increased dependence on
external suppliers will trigger a larger dependence of its economy on chan-
ges on global markets, the behaviour of the major energy exporters and
a lower resilience to possible disturbances.
With regard to their growing production and export potential, the Middle
East and the Caspian region will become more important for the EU ener-
gy market. In the coming decades both regions are set to experience a con-
siderable rise in oil production (with Saudi Arabia as the world’s leader
and in the Caspian region, Kazakhstan) and gas production (Iran, Iraq,
Qatar and Turkmenistan)14. Also an increase in Russian gas production will
be visible15. In the case of oil and coal, the importance of Russia on the
global scale and most likely in Europe will be diminishing16, although the
country will remain one of the vital suppliers of these resources.
In parallel, in recent years a greater demand for energy in other parts of
the world has been witnessed, above all in the fast-growing Asian eco-
nomies. The overall demand for oil in China and India in 2030 may even
be twice as large as oil consumption in the EU according to IEA predic-
tions, their overall demand for gas may grow several times (from 2.5 to
3.5 times)17. This means that the EU’s relative importance as an energy
consumer will be falling globally, whereas the competition for access to
energy resources will become increasingly intensified.
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13 See the EC, Baseline Scenario, 2009.
14 See IEA WEO 2010, New Policy Scenario predicts a rise in production in the Middle East
by 400 billion m3 by 2030, of which one third will be exported. The production in the Cas-
pian region will grow by approximately 155 billion m3, of which over 50%will be produced
by Turkmenistan.
15 See IEA WEO 2010, New Policy Scenario predicts an increase in Russia's production by
approximately 140 billion m3 by 2030. If reforms on the internal market are conducted in
parallel, the export potential will grow significantly.
16 In particular a decline in oil production in Russia is forecast (mainly in the regions that
provide a resource base for exports to Europe) and the development of alternative export
directions (including China).
17 See IEA WEO 2010.
II. The state of the EU external energy policy
1. The debate over the policy and its objectives
Although the EU market will remain one of the most important globally,
a relative decline in its significance and an insufficient degree of consoli-
dation will make access to energy resources more difficult for the EU. This
presents a challenge particularly in the context of an increasing depen-
dence on external supplies and is one of the main factors that shape EU
energy policy. The policy, especially its external dimension, is to a large ex-
tent unspecified, except for its widely recognised fundamental objective
of securing a sustainable and stable supply of energy to European reci-
pients. Being in statu nascendi EU energy policy is now to a large degree
a process without a single institutional and legal framework. It involves
a number of sectoral policies: environmental, competition, infrastructural.
Its specific objectives are a derivative of the EU’s economic, political, social
and territorial agenda. They are hence neither unequivocally defined nor
mutually exclusive.
The process of developing EU energy policy was usually gaining momen-
tum in the aftermath of energy crises. In the 1970s and 1980s these were
oil crises18, in 1999–2000 – a sharp increase of oil prices19, in 2006 – the
Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis20; in 2009 – a similar, more serious crisis
occurred, compounded by changes in the gas market (decreased demand,
oversupply, the greater availability of LNG, the prospects of non-conven-
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18 They sparked a debate over the common energy policy and resulted in the resolution
of the Council (1986) that defined the objectives of the EU energy policy.
19 See Green Paper, Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply,
November 2000, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_
paper_energy_supply_en.pdf
20 See Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,
March 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0105:
FIN:EN:PDF and Conclusions of the Council of March 2007.
tional gas). It seems however that in the last decade21 both the discussion
and concrete measures taken to develop the EU’s energy policy have been
gaining more sustainability and have been less directly linked with external
events, although crises still provide an impetus for more decisive actions22.
For several years the vision of an energy policy geared towards three over-
all groups of objectives – competitiveness, security of the energy supply,
and sustainable development (also environmentally-friendly)23 – was
prevalent in the EU. EU Member States have a relatively good understand-
ing of the course of action that should be taken in order to attain the ob-
jectives set for the EU’s internal energy policy. Despite fundamental diffe-
rences in specific issues, it is widely accepted that there is a need for a sin-
gle – liberalised and integrated – energy market meeting efficiency, sus-
tainability and environmental standards. It is certain that more dilem-
mas are provoked by questions about the shape and direction of the EU’s
external energy policy and the ways in which it can ensure secure and
stable energy supplies at competitive prices.
The vision of the priority objectives of the EU’s external energy policy has
been modified over recent years. In 2006–2008 the major challenges for
the stability of the energy supply to the EU were mainly seen in the be-
haviour of third countries or companies originating in them24. Large pro-
minence was therefore given to energy security and the security of supply
and these were defined as the primary objective of the EU’s external ener-
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21 The publication of the Green Paper of 2000 by the EC can be recognised as the begin-
ning of the current debate over the EU’s energy policy. The debate has been rather ani-
mated since 2006.
22 This is proven, among other measures, by actions taken with regard to the meltdown
in the nuclear power plant in Fukushima in Japan.
23 They are explicitly formulated in the Green Paper of the EC of 2006 and affirmed, among
other provisions, in Art. 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
24 The key factors for the external dimension of the EU’s energy policy were for example
identified in J. Solana’s paper S160/06 ‘An External Energy Policy to Serve Europe’s Interests’
as follows: a) growing dependence on external imports of energy resources; b) political insta-
gy policy25 to be achieved inter alia by diversifying sources and routes of
supply. However, for several years now the notion of energy security has
been devalued and diluted. Although it remains important as the EU’s
import dependency is growing (particularly in the context of the gas crisis
of 2009 and the unstable situation in North Africa and the Middle East),
increased attention has been given to the process of intensifying com-
petition on the energy market26.
Both in the debate at the EU level and in a part of the Member States27, em-
phasis is placed on the EU’s declining importance as a global energy con-
sumer, which may result in more difficult access to resources and the de-
creasing competitiveness of the EU’s economy. Enhancing the attractiveness
of the EUmarket as an energy consumer would consequently be one of the
vital objectives of the EU’s energy policy which would require complemen-
tary and cohesive actions both externally and on the internal market28.
In addition, an important factor that influences the process of the deve-
lopment of the energy policy is the repercussions of the economic crisis
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bility in a part of the essential areas of the production of resources; c) the risk that emerg-
ed after the gas crisis of January 2006 and consisted in using supplies as a political instru-
ment; d) the risk linked to the fact that bodies from third countries actively involved in
the internal market did not comply with EU competition rules.
25 In the Green Paper (2006) an increased collective external energy security for the EU was
the first of the objectives set for the external energy policy. Energy security has also been the
key question raised in the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. Second Strategic
Energy Review, 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm
26 Featured in Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy,
November 2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:
0639:FIN:EN:PDF and the discussions that preceded it.
27 This topic is an important element of the current debate over energy policy in Germany,
compare: A. Kwiatkowska-Dro˝d˝, The Deficit of Natural Resources Deficit: the implications
for German politics, CES, Warsaw, 2011 and the publication quoted there: http://www.
peak-oil.com/download/Peak%20Oil.%20Sicherheitspolitische%20Implikationen%20
knapper%20Ressourcen%2011082010.pdf
28 Including the cohesion of actions within the whole EU energy policy and the ability to
effectively attain external objectives while pursuing the policy of increasing energy self-
sufficiency (through greater energy efficiency and the share of renewable sources of
energy in the energy mix.
on global energy markets, including the EU market. In the current debate
proposals for improving and strengthening the EU’s relations with its
leading suppliers, including Russia, are being put forward. Other issues
being discussed are possible ways of increasing the EU’s attractiveness
and the role on the regional and global markets and the promotion,
through external activity within the framework of the EU energy policy,
of the interests of the EU and its particular Member States (e.g. by selling
green technologies or energy efficiency know-how)29. In parallel, an increas-
ed coordination of actions within the EU energy policy has been propos-
ed30, which can be facilitated by the completion of the internal energy
market and consequently a harmonisation of the energy interests of Mem-
ber States. Another position, extreme although not infrequent, views as ne-
cessary the limitation of the EU’s external energy policy and generally
the EU’s geopolitical ambitions in this sphere. It advocates instead a larg-
er focus on the internal market which could become even greater (if not
the only) objective and instrument of EU activity in the energy field31.
Divergences between particular Member States regarding the establish-
ment of the common external energy policy and differing views and defi-
nitions of its priorities are also noticeable. The dividing line between ‘new’
and ‘old’ EU Member States is quite clear. For the ‘new’ ones the establish-
ment of this policy is significant as – in their opinion – it would serve to
a large extent the achievement of short-term and medium-term objec-
tives of increasing energy security, above all by limiting unilateral de-
pendence on the supply of energy resources from Russia. On the other
hand, a substantial part of ‘old’ Member States has quite an ambivalent
approach to extending the competences of the EU in this sphere. In their
view, the focus of the EU’s external activities in the energy field should
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29 ”Energy 2020” and debates in a section of Member States.
30 Both as part of “Energy 2020” and also in the concept promoted by J. Buzek and J. Delors
– the establishment of a European community of energy, modelled on the community of
coal and steel, which would strengthen the unity of the EU.
31 Compare: G. Zachmann, Memo to the New Commissioner for Energy, Breugel Policy
Contribution, 2009 or P. Noel, Europe's external policy: Unrealistic yet unneeded, Euro-
pesWorld, 2008.
be on preventing the decline in competitiveness of EU economies and
the promotion of their know-how and exports. In order to achieve this
objective it is necessary to strengthen partnerships with producer coun-
tries, above all with Russia (also in the context of the events in North
Africa and the Middle East from the beginning of 2011).
2. The EU post-Lisbon energy policy
Before the modifications to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) introduced by
the Treaty of Lisbon (TL) came into force the provisions of primary law
concerning energy issues were overly incomplete and vague (see Table 1).
The separate chapter on energy appeared only in the TL32and formed the
basis for establishing the secondary law and the EU’s policy in this area.
Energy belongs to the realm of the shared competences between the Union
and the Members States33. Although the measures necessary to achieve
the objectives of EU’s energy policy – functioning of the energy market;
security of energy supply; promotion of energy efficiency and the inter-
connection of energy networks – are set by the European Parliament
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, this does not affect a member state’s right to determine the con-
ditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply34. Hence,
EU’s energy policy remains an intergouvernemntal process. The EC’s role
in developing and pursuing the energy policy energy is a derivative of
the Union competences in the integration of the common market, trans-
european networks35 and environment36.
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32 Chapter XXI of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
33 Art. 4 (2) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
34 Art. 194 (2) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
35 Art. 171 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
36 Art. 191 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.
The objectives of the EU energy policy stated in the TFEU are compatible
with the three objectives identified in the European debate and enu-
merated inter alia in the Green Paper of 2006 (see above) and are aimed
at ensuring the sustainability of the energy market and security of sup-
ply to the EU, supporting increased use of RES and expanding the inter-
connections of energy networks. The provisions of the Treaty also narrow
down the possibility of achieving these objectives to the framework of
the “establishing or functioning of the internal market while taking into
account the need for safeguarding and improving the environment” (for
more, see Table 1). The adopted approach implies therefore, that the EU
should use its internal market acquis as a basis for external action towards
third parties in order to promote the EU rules and mechanisms (related
to the market, energy and environment).
As the Treaty of Lisbon does not provide a single legislative, institutional
and political framework to puruse EU’s energy policy objectives, including
the issue of securing supply from third countries, it leaves ample room
for both the EC and the Members States to frame the policy and discuss
ways of its implementation; e.g. the notion of “security of energy supply”
is subject to various interpretations.
It is obvious that EU Member States have a desire for advanced autonomy
in this regard and want to limit the EC’s impact on the energy policy,
particularly on energy co-operation with third countries.
In practice, with the EU internal energy market and the growing depen-
dence of its processes on external factors, the EC is becoming increas-
ingly active in external energy policy in using most of all the internal
market-related (also financial) instruments it controls. It is not only the
Directorate-General for Energy that is responsible for energy issues but
also other directorates such as DG Trade, DG Competition, DG Enlarge-
ment that have an impact upon the shape of the energy policy.
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Table 1
1. The timeline of the most important changes in primary
law that bore impact on the EU’s energy policy
The Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), which was signed in 1957 and entered into force in 1958,
and the adjoined Protocol (14) concerning imports into the European
Community of petroleum products refined in the Netherlands Antilles
(1962) – introduced energy issues into the treaty-based law but it did
not represent a significant step in the development of the energy policy.
The Single European Act (SEA) – entered into force 1987 – stipulat-
ed that one of the Community’s objectives relating to the environ-
ment should be “to ensure a prudent and rational utilisation of natu-
ral resources”. In the protocol attached to the SEA a reservation was
made that actions undertaken by the Community cannot interfere
with its member states’ national policies focused on the exploitation
of energy resources.
The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, 1993) ex-
tended the range of the Communities’ competences by the measures
aimed at “encouraging the establishment and development of trans-
European networks” and “resources in the area of energy”. Also a de-
claration was attached to the Treaty that expressed the necessity of
considering the introduction of energy questions into the primary law,
compare below.
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), did not include separate regula-
tions regarding energy.
The Treaty of Lisbon (2010) introduced for the first time a separate
chapter devoted to energy issues and the “solidarity clause”.
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2. The most important provisions introduced by the Treaty
on European Union (TEU) regarding the energy policy
Article 21 (…)
2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions,
and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of inter-
national relations, in order to: (…)
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the
quality of the environment and the sustainable management of glo-
bal natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
3. The provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union regarding the energy policy
Article 4
1. The Union shall share competence with the Member States where
the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the
areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.
2. Shared competence between the Union and the Member States
applies in the following principal areas: (…)
(e) environment; (…)
(h) trans-European networks;
(i) energy;
Title XX ENVIRONMENT
Article 191
1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the
following objectives:
(…)
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– prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources,
– promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or
worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating cli-
mate change.
(…)
Article 192
1. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
shall decide what action is to be taken by the Union in order to
achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191.
2. By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided
for in paragraph 1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure
and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:
(…)
(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, may make the
ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the matters referred to
in the first subparagraph.
3. General action programmes setting out priority objectives to be attain-
ed shall be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after con-
sulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions. The measures necessary for the implementation of these pro-
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grammes shall be adopted under the terms of paragraph 1 or 2, as the
case may be.
4. Without prejudice to certain measures adopted by the Union, the
Member States shall finance and implement the environment policy.
5. Without prejudice to the principle that the polluter should pay, if
a measure based on the provisions of paragraph 1 involves costs deem-
ed disproportionate for the public authorities of a Member State, such
measure shall lay down appropriate provisions in the form of:
– temporary derogations, and/or
– financial support from the Cohesion Fund set up pursuant to Arti-
cle 177.
Title XVI TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORKS
Article 170
1. (…) the Union shall contribute to the establishment and devel-
opment of trans-European networks in the areas of transport,
telecommunications and energy infrastructures.
2. Within the framework of a system of open and competitive mar-
kets, action by the Union shall aim at promoting the interconnection
and interoperability of national networks as well as access to such net-
works. It shall take account in particular of the need to link island, land-
locked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the Union.
Article 171
1. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 170, the Union:
– shall establish a series of guidelines covering the objectives, prior-
ities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-
European networks; these guidelines shall identify projects of com-
mon interest,
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– shall implement any measures that may prove necessary to ensure
the interoperability of the networks, in particular in the field of tech-
nical standardisation,
– may support projects of common interest supported by Member
States, which are identified in the framework of the guidelines refer-
red to in the first indent, particularly through feasibility studies, loan
guarantees or interest-rate subsidies; the Union may also contribute,
through the Cohesion Fund set up pursuant to Article 177, to the fi-
nancing of specific projects in Member States in the area of transport
infrastructure.
The Union’s activities shall take into account the potential econom-
ic viability of the projects.
2. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate
among themselves the policies pursued at national level which may
have a significant impact on the achievement of the objectives referr-
ed to in Article 170. The Commission may, in close cooperation with
the Member State, take any useful initiative to promote such coordi-
nation.
3. The Union may decide to cooperate with third countries to pro-
mote projects of mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability
of networks.
Article 172
The guidelines and other measures referred to in Article 171(1) shall
be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Guidelines and projects of common interest which relate to the ter-
ritory of a Member State shall require the approval of the Member
State concerned.
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Title XXI ENERGY
Article 194
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the inter-
nal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the
environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solida-
rity between Member States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the develop-
ment of new and renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
2.Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Trea-
ties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures
necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Suchmeasures shall
be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions.
Such measures shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine
the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy sup-
ply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with a special legislative procedure, shall unanimously and
after consulting the European Parliament, establish the measures
referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature.
Declaration on Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union
The Conference believes that Article 194 does not affect the right of
the Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure their
energy supply under the conditions provided for in Article 347.
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Article 347
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking togeth-
er the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the internal mar-
ket being affected by measures which a Member State may be called
upon to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting
the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious inter-
national tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and
international security.
4. The most important EU directives regarding
the energy policy (energy security)
Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in
natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC
Directive 2005/89/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 18 January 2006 concerning measures to safeguard the security of
the supply of electricity and infrastructure investment
Regulation 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard the security of
gas supplies and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC
Directive 2003/55/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in
natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC
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Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and
repealing Directive 96/92/EC
Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an
obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude
oil and/or petroleum products (harmonising EU law with the provi-
sions of the International Energy Agency).
3. The instruments and their recipients
The instrumentation employed by the EU in its external energy policy is
complex, which is in part caused by a blurred division of competences
and a multitude of bodies involved in energy-related relations with third
countries. Only a section of these instruments exclusively concerns energy
issues, e.g. the Energy Charter or energy dialogues with third countries.
More of them provide a broader framework for economic co-operation,
including energy co-operation, e.g. the Partnership for Democracy and
Shared Prosperity, the Eastern Partnership. Certain initiatives overlap,
e.g. the initiatives regarding energy in the countries covered by the East-
ern Partnership overlap with earlier ones undertaken under the Baku Ini-
tiative or Black Sea Synergy. Part of the existing instruments of energy
co-operation constitute a single framework for a number of countries
(e.g. the Energy Community), others are partner-specific. Recently the EU
has been increasingly leaning towards multilateral tools of co-operation
with third countries as instruments establishing consistent frameworks
for the EU’s external activity. Nevertheless, bilateral instruments remain
quite an essential element of co-operation, particularly in relations with
the EU’s key partners. It remains to be seen which of these instruments
will prove to be more productive.
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The “Energy 2020”37 strategy and other related documents distinguish
three groups of recipients of the EU’s external energy policy: key partners,
neighbouring countries and the remaining countries – all the interna-
tional environment subject to EU global energy initiatives. The key part-
ners are essential suppliers of resources and transit countries like Russia,
Ukraine and Turkey. This group could also be enlarged to encompass key
global consumers (e.g. the US, China). The neighbouring countries in this
classification are Eastern and Southern states in the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy but to a certain extent also the Western Balkan states
which are aspiring for EU membership. In this perspective Ukraine is both
a neighbouring country and an EU key partner, which generates a certain
ambiguity with regard to the priority objectives and instruments. In pa-
rallel, this type of classification can be interpreted as granting privileges
to a group of EU partners without clarifying the exact criteria.
In its relations with key partners the EU is seeking to improve and streng-
then co-operation above all in order to ensure stable energy supplies at
competitive prices. The key instrument for this group seems to be strong
bilateral ties that allow package discussions about the most important
energy issues – e.g. within the framework of subsequently established
energy dialogues with Russia, China and Norway38. The effectiveness of
instruments of this type hinges largely on the partners’ mutual openness
to co-operation, the convergence of objectives and the capacity to develop
measures that take the interests of both parties into consideration. An ex-
ample of dialogue with relatively low effectiveness is the one between the
EU and Russia that has been ongoing for over a decade (see below). This
dialogue has helped resolve several current problems (e.g. ensuring safety
standards for maritime oil transportation in the Baltic Sea) but the attempts
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37 Apart from “Energy 2020” also in the background document for Public Consultation on
the External Dimension of the EU Energy Policy http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
international/consultations/doc/20110221_consultation_document.pdf)
38 Or similar, formal frameworks of bilateral co-operation, see Table 2 and for more:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/bilateral_cooperation_
en.htm
to develop legally binding rules of energy trading were unsuccessful.
In contrast, the EU dialogue with Norway is very productive, due in part
to large similarities of the energy market regulations, not to mention the
same normative and political foundation between the two.
Additionally, a vital factor influencing EU policy in this area is the strong
bilateral relations of particular EU Member States with individual pro-
ducer countries. In cases of convergence between the objectives of the EU
and particular Member States, bilateral talks may constitute one of the
most important tools that facilitate real co-operation. In other cases they
present a serious challenge to the EU’s common policy in this sphere.
The main objective of the EU’s policy towards broadly defined neighbour-
ing countries is the integration of their energy markets and infrastruc-
ture and harmonisation of their regulations with those of the EU. The sig-
nificance of this policy can be exemplified by the electricity market where
the EU, unlike in the case of the oil and gas markets, is not only an im-
porter but also an exporter of energy. In this regard both the compatibi-
lity of systems and the establishment of a level playing field for EU com-
panies and firms from neighbouring countries are essential39. The basic
mode of operation of the EU in its neighbourhood is the export of the EU
acquis communautaire concerning the energy sphere and also environ-
mental and nuclear security standards. The Energy Community frame-
work is one of the most important instruments being used for this pur-
pose; it has been the EU’s intention to extend it to as many countries
from its neighbourhood as possible (the Western Balkan states, Moldova
and Ukraine are already members of the Energy Community). One of the
fundamental challenges for this initiative is the lack of legal and political
tools for enforcing commitments on the one hand, and the reluctance of
the Energy Community’s member states to effectively implement particu-
lar provisions40 on the other. The countries of the widely defined neigh-
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39 See: A Euroelectric response paper, Public Consultation on the External Dimension of
the EU Energy Policy, March 2011 and the ENTSO-E response to the Public Consultation
on the External Dimension of the EU Energy Policy Brussels, March 2011.
40 See, among other publications, A. Boodts, La Communaute de l'Energie: un bilan cinq
ans apres, Note de l'ifri, 2010, p.15-17.
bourhood also seem to closely tie energy co-operation with the overall
terms and objectives of their co-operation with the EU. The communi-
cation on the new European Neighbourhood Policy presented on May 25,
2011, reads that energy co-operation „will be stepped up through increas-
ed energy policy dialogue aiming at further market integration, improved
energy security based on converging regulatory frameworks, including
on safety and environmental standards, the development of new partner-
ships on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, and nuclear
safety.” Furthermore, it stresses that in the medium term this could lead
to extending the Energy Community Treaty to neighbours not yet party
to it or, building on its experience, establishing a complementary “EU-
Southern Mediterranean Energy Community”41. However whereas in the
EU external energy policy the sectoral approach is the most visible, the
EU’s neighbours have a wider perspective on the attractiveness of the
entire EU political offer. The instruments aimed at exporting EU market
rules and energy standards are observed to be most effective with the
countries that regard the fulfilment of EU expectations in the area of
energy as a way of achieving integration perspective.
The EU also initiates a series of global initiatives aimed at increasing
energy efficiency, climate protection42 and the reduction in emissions, nu-
clear security etc. For many years another important objective for the EU
has been the establishment of international rules for the functioning of
energy markets (trade in energy resources, transit, investments). The Ener-
gy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol created for this purpose have
proven rather ineffective as many countries that are key to the global and
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41 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A new response to a changing
Neighbourhood, Brussels, 25/05/2011 COM(2011) 303.
42 One of Brussels' greater successes was negotiating and implementing the Kyoto
Protocol. The elaboration of a post-Kyoto document that would allow further reductions
in GHG emissions worldwide is much more difficult, particularly in the context of the
growing assertiveness of the emerging economies and the related declining effective-
ness of multilateral forums.
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Instruments
a. bilateral
Energy Dialogue
Bilateral agreements of
various types, regarding
overall economic
co-operation, including
on energy, among them:
Partnership and
Co-operation Agreements
(PCA), Free Trade
Agreements, Stabilisation
and Association
Agreements (SAA)
Memoranda of
understanding relating
to co-operation in the area
of energy (MoU)
b. multilateral
Energy Community
European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument
Energy Dialogue
Co-operation with the Gulf
Cooperation Council
Baku Initiative
(INOGATE, Traceca)
Partners
Brazil (since 2007), China (since 2005),
India (since 2004), Iraq (since 2010),
Norway (since 2005), Russia (since 2000),
Republic of South Africa (since 2008),
Ukraine (since 2005), US (since 2006)
– EU's economic partners worldwide
– PCA were signed with the majority of the member
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) and they were one of the instruments
in the EU neighbourhood policy
– Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
Agreements – an instrument of the EPS
(Eastern partners)
EU's energy partners, including Ukraine, the states
from the Caspian region, MoU was also the first
stage of deepened energy relations
The closest neighbours: currently its members are
the Balkan states, Ukraine, Moldova; the observers
include: Turkey, Norway and Georgia
17 states of the neighbourhood
Oil producers grouped together in OPEC
EU's assistance programme aimed at Turkey and
the member states of the CIS (Russia as an observer)
Table 2. The most important instruments of the EU’s external energy policy
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Black Sea Regional
Energy Centre (BSREC)
Caspian Development
Corporation (CDC)
Union for the
Mediterranean, the
Barcelona Process
c. global
Energy Charter
Kyoto Protocol
International Energy
Forum (IEF)
G8 and G20
11 states of the Black Sea basin
Companies from the Caspian region
16 states located on the Mediterranean Sea
in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans
Signed by 51 countries, in reality many countries
that are important for the global energy market
remain outside the structures of this organisation:
Norway, Australia (it has not ratified this document);
Russia withdrew from the Energy Charter in 2009.
The observers include: Algeria, Canada, China, Egypt,
Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, the US, Venezuela
Signed and ratified by 191 states worldwide,
except for the US
It gathers the states which account for approxi-
mately 90% of the global demand and supply for
gas and oil, including the states with membership
in IEA, OPEC; also Brazil, China and Russia
8 and 20 of the world's richest states
European energy market (including Russia and Norway) have not ratified
these documents. The ideas arising for a reform of this instrument or for
the replacement of it with a new one43 are currently rather vague and do
not enjoy wide support from Member States. It therefore seems that they
will not be easily implemented at least in the near future.
Currently, the key role in relations with external partners and the EU ex-
ternal energy policy is played by the EU’s internal market and its regula-
tions. The achievement of the objectives linked to a liberalisation of the
energy market, its integration, energy efficiency and the share of RES
in the energy mix, etc. by Member States themselves seems in many cases
to be the essential instrument in external contacts (mainly on a regional le-
vel). An efficiently operating, single EU market may increase energy secu-
rity (e.g. the effectiveness of emergency response mechanisms), the flexi-
bility of the market, its self-sufficiency, and external credibility. Poten-
tially it can also contribute to a greater attractiveness of the EU for energy
suppliers and a greater effectiveness in negotiating the terms of supplies
(including prices). At the same time, EU competition law44 and the libera-
lisation of the EU gas and electricity markets45 make it necessary to modify
the ways of operation in the EU for third country companies. Finally, the
EU’s ambition to export its own regulations and standards outside is quite
apparent. In relations with neighbouring countries, this objective is ex-
plicitly defined (and there are instruments created particularly for this
purpose – see above). In contacts with other producers the principle of
conditionality is sometimes used and part of the trade exchange made
conditional on the compliance with certain standards (as in the example
of Russian petroleum products), whereas in the case of other energy con-
sumers, the EU is trying to promote its norms (related inter alia to the
environment, energy efficiency) on international forums (e.g. in climate
negotiations).
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43 See for instance Germany's idea of an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe related to energy, or Russia's concept of new rules of global energy co-operation.
44 Art. 101 of the Treaty on European Union enforced the adjustment of contracts for gas
supplies from third country companies to the rules governing the EU internal market.
45 At first Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC, then replaced by Directives 2009/72/EC
and 2009/73/EC.
The EU does not have a single and efficient financial instrument that
would enable it to attain its external energy policy objectives or even to
implement infrastructure projects in third countries. So far the majority
of projects have been financed under multilateral or bilateral co-opera-
tion programmes (see Table 3). Energy investments within the EU for the
period of 2007–2013 are supported through the Cohesion Fund46 and the
European Regional Development Fund47. Trans-European networks (TEN)48,
i.e. infrastructural projects, including those linking the EU with third coun-
tries, are funded (besides the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional
Development Fund) under a special line in the EU budget (TEN-budget Line)
and by the European Investment Bank49 (EIB). Energy, and the objective
of “ensuring the security of external supplies and economic development”,
is one of the six areas supported by the EIB50. Furthermore, the EU has the
possibility of using funds from the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), in which EU Member States are majority share-
holders, and those of other financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank) in
which EU Member States hold shares.
In 2009–2010 in an unprecedented move, the EU decided to back up a series
of energy projects (such as RES and CCS projects and cross-border gas
and electricity infrastructure) through a one-off instrument – the European
Energy Recovery Fund. The selected infrastructural projects related to
Caspian gas imports and interconnections with North Africa (see below)
then received co-funding possibilities. Towards the end of 2010 the Energy
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46 For issues related to environment and energy efficiency compare: http://ec.europa.eu/
regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/2007/publications/guide2007_en.pdf
47 For energy infrastructure aimed at increasing security, energy efficiency and renewable
sources of energy compare: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/
regulation/pdf/2007/feder/ce_1080%282006%29_en.pdf
48 Initiated in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty.
49 http://www.eib.org/
50 EU Member States are shareholders in the EIB. When deciding to grant a loan to a parti-
cular project they are to a large extent guided by political reasons. The Treaty of Lisbon de-
creased the possibility of Member States influencing the EIB and decisions about financing
projects partly or totally outside the EU will be taken by the EIB Board of Governors.
infrastructure package presented by the EC proposed the establishment
of a new financial instrument that would allow the support of key ener-
gy infrastructure projects, particularly in cases where barriers to their
implementation existed (e.g. their implementation would increase com-
petition and thus has not been in interest of companies operating on
specific markets).
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Name of instrument
European
Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument
(earlier TACIS, MEDA)
together with the
financial mechanism –
Neighbourhood
Investment Facility
Development
Cooperation Instrument,
together with
the financial mechanism
– Latin America
Investment Facility
European Development
Fund (EDF)
Recipient
16 states covered
by the European
Neighbourhood
Policy (CIS and the
Mediterranean Sea
states)
47 developing states
from Latin America,
Asia and Central Asia,
the Persian Gulf
(Iran, Iraq and Yemen)
and the Republic
of South Africa
Development assistance
for Africa, Caribbean
and Pacific states (ACP)
and 21 states and
dependent territories
of the Member States
(Denmark, France,
the Netherlands
and the UK)
Details
The budget of the
whole instrument for
2007–2013 stands
at approximately
EUR 12 billion.
The budget of the whole
instrument that supports
EU programmes aimed
at (among other issues)
the protection of the
environment, the sustain-
able management
of mineral resources
and energy saving,
for 2007–2013 stands
at EUR 16.9 billion.
The budget
of the whole instrument
for 2008–2013
is EUR 22.7 million.
Table 3. The financial instruments used, among other functions, to achieve
the objectives of the EU’s external energy policy
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Instrument for
Pre-Accession
Assistance (earlier
PHARE and CARDS)
Nuclear Safety
Co-operation Instrument
(NSCI)
European Investment
Bank (EIB)
European Development
and Co-operation
Bank/European Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD)
Aimed at the Western
Balkan states –
the candidate countries
or potential EU member
states
Increase in nuclear
security, transportation
of supplies and waste
transportation, etc.
in third countries
Approximately 140
countries worldwide
which signed
co-operation agreements
with the EU
29 states from
South-East Europe
and the CIS states
The budget of the whole
instrument is EUR 12.9
million.
The budget
for 2007–2013
is EUR 524 million.
III. The EU’s external energy policy:
lessons learned
The EU’s policy is to a large extent shaped by practice, which is espe-
cially visible in crisis situations (as is proven by the developments fol-
lowing the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 or the impact
of the catastrophe at the Fukushima nuclear power plant). A lot of the
instruments which were being created or the applied modes of opera-
tion have to date been case-specific or partner-specific; sometimes they
were created as precedents. Particular attention was paid to relations
with: the EU’s most important energy partner, Russia; its key transit
country, Ukraine; the priority infrastructure project outside the EU, the
Southern Corridor; and North Africa – which in the light of the recent
events represents an example of current serious challenges for the EU’s
external energy policy.
1. The EU energy policy towards Russia
Russia is the EU’s strategic energy partner. It is the major supplier of
energy resources to the EU as the largest supplier of gas, oil and coal (see
above and Appendix). Russia is an attractive market for investments by
European energy companies51 and an increasingly important investor on
the EU energy market. Last but not least, it is a substantial consumer of re-
sources and the fourth (after China, the US and the EU) emitter of green-
house gases.
With regard to this, the objective of the EU’s policy towards Russia in the
area of energy is to establish strong and sustainable bilateral relations
based on binding, internationally recognised principles (e.g. those of the
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51 Member States account for approximately 75% of accumulated foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) of which the energy sector is responsible for the majority.
World Trade Organisation, the Energy Charter Treaty) and/or EU internal
regulations. Such relations would be aimed at contributing to:
– the competitive, stable and sustainable supply energy based on trans-
parent conditions;
– the development of a clear and non-discriminatory investment climate;
– the development of binding and transparent energy transit rules also
with regard to transit through Russian territory;
– the adoption and implementation by Russia of energy efficiency and
climate protection standards.
The achievement of the first of these objectives is particularly important
given the EU’s growing demand for energy (gas) and the intensifying
international competition for access to energy (see above).
The key document regulating overall EU-Russian economic co-operation
is the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) of 1997, correspond-
ing to the agreements concluded with the majority of the EU’s Eastern
neighbours52. The PCA covers, among other issues, energy relations which,
according to the document, should be governed by the principles of the
Energy Charter Treaty signed by both parties and its Transit Protocol53.
As Russia did not accept part of the provisions of the Energy Charter, in-
cluding those on investments and transit, in 2009 Russia in fact withdrew
from the Treaty54. In parallel, it presented its own project of new princi-
ples for international energy cooperation which in many points was con-
vergent with the provisions of the Treaty, except for what Russia consid-
ered to be the most controversial issues, such as for instance the transit
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52 The same type of bilateral agreement was signed with the majority of post-Soviet
states (except for Belarus and the Baltic states) – compare: Integration or imitation. The
EU and its Eastern Neighbours, K. Pełczyƒska-Nał´cz, CES, Warsaw 2011.
53 The Energy Charter Treaty signed in 1994, by Russia – conditionally for 15 years, since
2000 the Transit Protocol has been undergoing negotiation; to a large extent it is unac-
ceptable to Russia. For more information: http://www.encharter.org
54 In 2009 Russia's temporary signature of the Treaty expired and Russia did not decide
to prolong it. At the same time, from the legal point of view the provisions of the Treaty
bind Russia with regard to the investments made on Russian territory before the expira-
tion date of the Russian signature (see the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in The Hague of November 2009 concerning Yukos).
of resources55. Thus the Russian proposal enabled interpretations that
Russia is de facto still involved in the Energy Charter process and the
possibility exists for its re-engagement in a modernisation of the Treaty56.
The EU is still counting on basing energy relations with Russia on the Ener-
gy Charter principles which it plans to include in the new basic agreement
currently being negotiated with Russia (a ‘new PCA’)57.
An important initiative shaping EU-Russian relations also in the energy
field is the Partnership for Modernisation. Actions undertaken under this
initiative within this framework are aimed, among other issues, at increas-
ing the energy efficiency of the Russian economy, reducing GHG emissions
and harmonising technical regulations and standards with those in the
EU58. Under the Partnership, Russia is hoping to gain access to Western
know-how and technologies and this presents its EU partners the oppor-
tunity to try to gain concrete benefits related to energy co-operation in
exchange59.
The main platform of EU-Russian energy relations since 2001 has remain-
ed the energy dialogue divided into three thematic groups (focused res-
pectively on the energy strategies of the two parties, the development
of the market and energy efficiency). Within this framework the discus-
sion is concentrated in particular on controversial issues in mutual rela-
tions, including questions linked to the liberalisation of the EU gas market
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55 For more information see: The External Energy Policy of the European Union: European
Energy Foreign Policy and the Relationship with Russia, Roland Gotz, IFRI, Paris, 2008
and The Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation,
April 2009, Official website of The President of Russia.
56 See e.g. The Energy Charter Revisited, K. Westphal, SWP, March 2011.
57 The negotiations have been continuing since 2008 and the chances of finalising them
in the coming months are remote.
58 Other priorities of the Partnership include improving the investment climate and the
liberalisation of trade. The initiative was launched in June 2010 (formally by the conclusions
of the European Council of October 2010) and aimed at fostering EU and Russia co-oper-
ation for the purpose of modernising Russia, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf
59 There are ideas to entice Russia into the process of reforming the Energy Charter Treaty
by giving it access to technology.
and its consequences for Russia or the exchange of information concern-
ing unexpected changes in the conditions of energy supplies.
Finally, EU acquis that influence the functioning of Russian companies
(Gazprom) on the EU energy market are an important instrument of the EU
external energy policy in relations with Russia and Russian companies60
(for more information see below).
Fairly intensive relations have not – so far – contributed to a sustainable
and systemic regulation of EU-Russian economic co-operation, including
energy relations. The talks about bilateral agreements (see the negotia-
tions for the new PCA) and/or possible multilateral ones (despite the ex-
perience with the Energy Charter) have been continuing. Reaching a le-
gally binding consensual agreement appears presently rather unrealistic
in both cases due to prevailing differences between the parties. However
several current specific issues or concrete cases have been resolved. The
ongoing energy dialogue has enabled inter alia: an increase in the safety
of maritime oil transport in the Baltic Sea by promoting the use of double-
hulled tankers61; reaching consensus on the maintenance of the long-term
gas supply contracts, despite the ongoing EU gas market liberalisation
(on condition that their provisions comply with EU law); the adoption of
agreeing to the reinforced Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) by both par-
ties in 2009, which was to enable rapid information exchange in case of
possible disruptions of electricity, gas and oil supply (currently, howev-
er, it is quite hard to clearly assess the effectiveness of this tool).
Internal EU rules seem to have been the most effective instrument in
recent years. They have indirectly pushed Russian companies (Gazprom)
to a partial change of their modes of functioning on the EU market and
have facilitated gradual adjustments of particular gas supply contracts
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60 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/
2011-03-02/rosja-ue-spor-o-unijny-rynek-gazu
61 In response to increased exports of Russian oil through the Baltic Sea (via the extended
terminal in Primorsk). In 2001 the parties agreed it was necessary to make better use of the
existing pipelines. Despite this, in 2009 Russia launched the construction of the terminal
in Ust-Luga, which will increase the transport of oil through the Baltic Sea at the expense
of pipelines.
to EU competition law and liberalisation directives. The recently imple-
mented third gas directive contains the requirement for all companies ope-
rating on the EU market, including foreign ones, to conform to its regula-
tions (the ‘third-country’ clause). In consequence of the efforts of the EC
continued from 2001, and pressure on European companies, the destina-
tion clause has been removed from Gazprom’s contracts with Italy’s ENI,
Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas and Austria’s OMV and recently also from the
contract with Poland’s PGNiG. It is, however, important to bear in mind
that in most cases in exchange for withdrawing this clause Gazprom
succeeded in securing itself new concessions from its European partners
(including access to the internal market). Recently, the EC has been insist-
ing on the enforcement of the third party access (TPA) principle with
regard to EU energy infrastructure. It resulted inter alia in attempts to
modify contracts granting Gazprom full capacity of specific infrastruc-
tural facilities (for more on this issue, see below).
There are at least two fundamental causes of difficulties in Russia-EU bi-
lateral energy relations. The first one is the essentially divergent energy
interests of both parties, the second is the insufficient level of mutual trust
compounded by a series of events that have occurred in recent years62. The
differences are to a large degree natural – the EU’s interests are defined
by the fact that the EU is both a consumer and importer of energy re-
sources, whereas Russia’s objectives are determined by its role of produ-
cer and exporter of resources. The economic systems of both sides also
differ63 – the EU has adopted, supported and promoted a liberal market
economy and its solutions, whereas Russia is a proponent of the state’s
strong involvement in the economy. This also results in an organic diffi-
culty in reconciling the EU’s objectives of ensuring security of supply with
the Russian need for security of demand, which may be illustrated by set-
backs in developing the common energy transit rules binding both Russia
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62 Including gas crises and unannounced halts/restrictions in Russian fuel supplies;
changes in the conditions of foreign investors operations in the Russian upstream; block-
ing Russian investments in the EU (e.g. the case of Centrica).
63 See e.g. the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Science’s response to
public Consultations on the EU’s external Energy Policy.
and third countries (and the fiasco of the Energy Charter in this area).
The changing rules of the game on the EU energy market (due to ongoing
liberalisation) or the process – intensively promoted recently by the EU
– of extending the Energy Community both present further challenges
for Russia and its energy interests. In particular, if Ukraine and Moldova
implemented the Energy Community provisions, it would be equal to the
adoption by these countries of the EU model of the energy market and
thus a rejection of the Russian solutions64. The problem of security of de-
mand that Russia is confronted with has been especially visible recently
in connection with the changes in the European gas market (oversupply,
competition from LNG and, potentially, non-conventional gas) as in the
third quarter of 2010 the consumption of Russian gas in the EU fell on
average by 25% and in the case of several important consumers by as
much as 50%.
Another challenge for the EU in its energy relations with Russia is the
character of the external energy policy and, more broadly, the economic
policy pursued by Russia. Russia effectively evades legally-binding com-
mitments which would restrict its autonomy. This often results in avoid-
ing entering bilateral or multilateral agreements, their low effectiveness
or insufficient enforcement. The PCA now in force is to a large extent
asymmetrical – it is less favourable to the EU and its Member States and
does not introduce an effective mechanism for resolving EU-Russian dis-
putes, whereas it grants Russia many privileges and large freedom in pur-
suing its trade policy. The effectiveness of this document is also limited by
the fact that Russia is not a WTO member65 and withdrew from the Energy
Charter Treaty. Consequently, there is no legal framework regulating bila-
teral energy co-operation, along with other areas. This has negative impli-
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64 This can be exemplified by the prospect of these countries joining the ENTSO-E elec-
tricity network and system and thus disconnecting from the IPS/UPS unified power sys-
tem interconnecting CIS territory (including Russia). At the same time the synchronisa-
tion of the Russian and EU systems has reached a deadlock.
65 It is most likely that Russia will not become a member of this organisation by the end
of 2011.
cations in case of disruptions or halts of supply66 because there are no for-
mal tools or provisions to use in such situations. Moreover, there are no
clear investment rules for foreign engagement in the Russian energy sec-
tor. Moscow prefers to realise the majority of its vital energy-related objec-
tives directly in cooperation with particular Member States by main-
taining strong bilateral political and business relations.
Additionally, the EU-Russian energy relations are also to some degree in-
fluenced by the directions and effects of Russia’s internal energy policy.
The strategy for the development of Russian energy reserves and its con-
sequences represent one of the challenges the EU is confronted with. The
excessive exploitation of older deposits, frequent modifications of invest-
ment programmes for the development of new ones, insufficient funding
available for research and exploration activities, an unfavourable and
ever-changing investment climate (e.g. with regard to the protection of
property rights) – all of these provoke questions about future access to
Russian energy resources and the resource base for supplies to Europe
(particularly important in the case of oil). These problems may be further
exacerbated by the fact that Moscow is seeking to diversify its exports
directions (e.g. by strengthening co-operation with China).
2. Case study: the EC’s involvement in the gas relations of
‘new’ Member States with Russia
The recent examples of the EC’s involvement in bilateral gas relations of
some of ‘new’ Member States with Russia provide a remarkable illustra-
tion of the EU using its internal market regulations to shape its energy
relations with Russia. Since 2010 the EC has become engaged in the fol-
lowing cases:
a) Polish-Russian negotiations of the gas agreement: above all in talks
concerning the gas transit provisions and the rules of the functioning of
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66 Since 2006 supplies of Russian gas to European recipients have been restrained three
times and supplies of oil – twice, including in 2009 despite the advanced work on the
Early Warning Mechanism.
the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline (the EC was insisting on the independence
of the transmission system operator and guarantees of TPA);
b) Bulgarian-Russia gas relations: consultations of a draft agreement con-
cerning the construction of South Stream67 and pushing Bulgaria to modify
both this agreement and the intergovernmental one between Bulgaria and
Russia from 200868 so that the TPA principle is enforced with regard to Bul-
garian transmission infrastructure;
c) Lithuanian-Russian gas relations: the EC received a formal complaint and
request from the Lithuanian government to examine whether Russia’s Gaz-
prom could be abusing its dominant market position (and e.g. increasing
prices). Simultaneously, further EC engagement in bilateral gas relations
is very likely with regard to the development of the implementation
mode for the third liberalisation package in Lithuania. In a move aimed
primarily at the defence of its energy interests, Lithuania – as one of few
Central and Eastern European countries – has decided to implement a full
ownership unbundling. This brings it into a clear conflict of interests with
Gazprom, which is the co-owner of Lietuvos Dujos, a dominant company
on the Lithuanian gas market responsible for the import and distribution
of gas and the operator of the whole transmission infrastructure (struc-
ture of ownership: E.ON – 38.9%, Gazprom – 37.1%, the remainder – the
state treasury). In the situation where full ownership unbundling is im-
plemented, Gazprom (similarly to E.ON) would be forced to sell off part
of its Lithuanian assets.
In all three of the above mentioned cases there is much to indicate that it
was the initiative of the newMember States (the governments of Poland,
Bulgaria and Lithuania) which resulted in an unprecedented69 involve-
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67 The Bulgarian-Russian agreement concerning the establishment of a joint venture
which would be responsible for the construction of the Bulgarian section of the planned
South Stream gas pipeline.
68 Which according to the media guarantees Russia full and unrestricted transit of Russian
gas, compare: http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/8178620
69 The EC has already used EU competition law in order to push for changes in the terms
and conditions of the supply of gas (compare below). In this case however it has for the
first time institutionally participated in bilateral negotiations with the supplier with the
consent of a Member State (possibly at its request).
ment of the EC in their gas relations with Russia. The primary goal of such
an engagement was to increase their bargaining power and chances for
achieving at least part of the objectives in negotiations with Russia. At the
same time it is quite evident that the EC has been willing to become
engaged in those negotiations for several reasons. Firstly, it has been try-
ing to ensure the implementation of EU regulations, so far mainly those
of the second liberalisation package (including the TPA principle) to new
bilateral agreements and to those already existing. Simultaneously, the
EC has been working on developing the modes of implementation of the
third package provisions70, including the ownership unbundling of the
activities related to the production and sales of gas from its transmission,
also in the case of investments by third country companies. This seems
specifically vital in the countries where Gazprom, the biggest single sup-
plier of gas, is also co-owner of part of the transmission networks (e.g.
in Poland and Lithuania71). The way in which the Russian side will adapt
to the changing rules of the EU’s liberalising gas market may signifi-
cantly influence the process of developing future EU-Russian gas rela-
tions. Furthermore, in becoming involved in what had so far be seen as
the sole competence of Member States, the EC sees an opportunity for
increasing its role and competences in energy relations with third coun-
tries, not only temporarily but also in a more sustainable manner.
Although the EC becoming engaged in the gas relations of the ‘new’ Mem-
ber States and Russia did not bring complete success, it had some visible
immediate results. The formal conformity of the Polish-Russian gas agree-
ment with EU liberalisation rules (the second package) was guaranteed.
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70 The Directive came into force on 3 March 2011 but the ownership separation will be
implemented by 3 March 2012 and the issuing of certificates that authorise operators
controlled by companies from third countries to operate on the EU market will be com-
pleted by 3 March 2013.
71 The implementation mode of the third package provisions will also be essential for
Estonia which, as Lithuania has, has decided to fully unbundle its gas sector. Also in
Estonia Gazprom is the major shareholder in the most important company on the gas
market – Eesti Gaas. So far this question has not been subject to public debate, neither
was the possibility raised of the EC's involvement in Estonian-Russian bilateral talks.
What is even more important, the case of Poland constituted a precedent
of EC direct involvement in a Member State’s bilateral gas negotiations
with a third country72. It is however unclear how the specific provisions
of the negotiated agreement will be implemented – what the actual com-
petences the new transmission operator of the Polish section of the Yamal–
–Europe gas pipeline (Gaz System) are and whether third party access to
this pipeline will be feasible in the coming years. Given the date of sign-
ing the agreement it was not possible to ensure its compliance with the
third liberalisation package73 and it is not sure how its implementation
provisions will affect the Polish-Russian gas deal. The case of Bulgaria and
its consultations with the EC led to some adjustments of the agreement
related to the construction of South Stream. However, more important
from the EC’s perspective is the question of the adaptation of the previ-
ous Bulgarian-Russian-transit agreement to the EU rules and it seems to
remain unresolved. In the case of Lithuania, the mere vision of imple-
menting a full ownership unbundling has become one of the key lever-
age methods in Vilnius’s gas negotiations with Moscow.
All three cases have led to greater exposure in public debate on the im-
portance of harmonising bilateral energy contracts with EU regulations.
In consequence, one of the conclusions of the February 2011 EU Energy
Council was to call on Member States to inform the EC from 2012 about
their existing and new bilateral energy agreements with third countries74.
Less directly, the above cases have made the question of ownership un-
bundling and Gazprom’s mode of operation on the EU’s liberalising mar-
ket one of the key topics in EU-Russian energy talks75.
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72 This type of involvement was made possible thanks to the fact that in the case of Poland
(as well as Bulgaria) the intergovernmental gas agreement (in parallel to corporate ones)
was in operation.
73 The agreement was signed on 29 October 2010 and the third package came into effect
on 3 March 2011 (see above).
74 See: Conclusions on Energy, European Council 4 February, PCE 026/11, point 11.
75 See issues discussed in Putin–Barroso talks in Brussels, February 2011: http://www.
eubusiness.com/news-eu/russia-energy-gas.8rf/
However the long-term effects of such activities from the EC depend on
many factors, including the EC’s consistency in implementing the third
package (here the case of Lithuania might appear particularly significant)
and the actual possibility of institutionalising this type of EU engage-
ment in gas relations with third countries.
Meanwhile, it is not clear if the Member States would decide to grant the
EC such competences. A large part of them regards the EC’s involvement
in bilateral negotiations of gas agreements (the case of Poland) as a vio-
lation of their exclusive competences. It is also difficult to determine
how durable the willingness of the ‘new’ Member States is to formally
empower the EU with the rights to participate in their gas relations with
Russia in a more sustainable and regular manner. It is not clear to what
extent their recent openness to EU engagement was not simply driven
above all by current interests and the EC’s involvement used as an ele-
ment of the game (which could be e.g. suggested by the case of Bulgaria:
the EC’s recommendations of changes in the provisions of the main Bul-
garian-Russian gas agreement have not thus far received much under-
standing). Finally, it is not certain how strong the EU’s determination
will be to implement the liberalising gas market regulations in the case
of its strategic relations with Russia. Russia’s firm opposition to several
provisions of EU directives (and in some cases the support it can receive
from European companies) and Russia’s importance as a supplier (grow-
ing recently due to the unrest in North Africa and the Middle East) may
constitute an argument forcing the EC to seek compromise.
3. The EU energy policy towards Ukraine
Ukraine is the most important corridor for gas transit to Europe – in 2009
74% of Russian gas exports to the EU were sent via Ukrainian infrastruc-
ture76. Ukraine also plays quite a substantial role in Russian oil transit to
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76 According to Gazprom’s website (http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/?id=4), over 99 bcm
out of 133.8 bcm of Russian gas sent in 2009 to the EU.
the EU (Central Europe). In parallel, this country is one of the most im-
portant countries of the EU’s neighbourhood, and also one of the most
important partners within its neighbourhood policy (ENP).
There seem to be two general objectives of EU energy policy towards
Ukraine. On the one hand, co-operation with Ukraine is vital for the sta-
bility and sustainability of the gas supply to the EU, and one of Brussels’
priorities has been the development of rules contributing to the security
of gas transit via Ukrainian territory. On the other hand, the shape, struc-
ture and efficiency of the large Ukrainian energy market influence the EU
market, the investment opportunities for European companies etc. Con-
sequently, the EU’s second general objective is to promote the reform of
the Ukrainian energy market (gas, coal and electricity sectors) which
would lead to it having greater transparency and stability, a limiting of
energy intensity, the increased use of RES, the popularisation of nuclear
safety or environmental protection standards etc. The ultimate goal of
the EU’s policy in that respect would be the integration of the Ukrainian
market with the EU’s.
In its relations with Ukraine, the EU is using both instruments devoted
to energy issues per se and those of a more general scope of bilateral
economic co-operation or EU neighbourhood policy. The majority of instru-
ments in use serve the realisation of the EU’s two above mentioned fun-
damental energy-related objectives in Ukraine – ensuring transit security
and integrating (on an institutional and physical level) the Ukrainian
energy market with the EU’s.
The basis for EU-Ukrainian bilateral energy relations provides the Memo-
randum of Understanding in Energy between the EU and Ukraine of De-
cember 2005. This document defined roadmaps and rules of co-operation77.
Currently the Joint EU-Ukrainian declaration after the Joint EU-Ukraine Inter-
national Investment Conference on the Modernisation of Ukraine’s Gas Transit
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77 The roadmaps for co-operation include: the safety of operating Ukrainian nuclear po-
wer plants; the integration of the gas and electricity markets; the security of the energy
supplies and the transit of hydrocarbons; the coal sector; and, added in 2008, energy effi-
ciency and RES. Progress in particular areas is monitored and recorded in reports, see
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/ukraine_en.htm
System constitutes an important instrument aimed at enhancing the sta-
bility of gas transit through Ukrainian territory and in fact provides the
foundation for EU-Ukrainian gas relations. This document sets numerous
goals related to the Ukrainian gas market reform and its rapprochement
to the EU’s model, the achievement of which should lead to support from
international financial institutions for the modernisation of Ukrainian gas
pipelines. Earlier, the Energy Charter Treaty, ratified by Ukraine in the late
1990s, was aimed at establishing clear transit rules. In fact it failed to do
so as became apparent during the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian gas cri-
ses78. Furthermore, the EU’s actual impact on the transit rules in the case
of Ukraine is limited by the fact that majority of Russian gas transmitted
via the Ukrainian network is being contracted by European companies on
the EU-Ukrainian border (and not the Russian-Ukrainian one).
The formal framework and directions for the reforms of the Ukrainian
energy sectors is set by the Energy Community which Ukraine joined in
201079. According to the Energy Community’s provisions, among what
Ukraine is committed to are: the adaptation of its energy law to the
acquis communautaire in the areas of electricity, gas, the environment,
competition, and renewable energy80. Within a year it should implement
the second liberalisation package. In parallel with the general frame-
work of the Energy Community, specific instruments are used for specific
issues related to the reforms of particular sectors. In the case of the gas
market it is inter alia the above mentioned Declaration of March 2009;
the Eastern European Energy Efficiency and Environmental Partnership
(E5P)81 is aimed at boosting energy efficiency; co-operation with ENTSO-E
serves the purpose of integrating the Ukrainian and EU markets etc.
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78 The lack of Russian ratification of The Charter was one of the key factors limiting its
effectiveness in those cases.
79 Ukraine's membership was officially approved on 1 February 2011.
80 See http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_
COMMUNITY/Legal/EU_Legislation
81 It is the instrument developed under the Eastern Partnership and it enables the fund-
ing of particular projects with the support of the EBRD and the EIB.
EU-Ukrainian energy relations also from EU’s perspective should become
the focus of a more general document related to bilateral trade co-opera-
tion. Energy constitutes one of the chapters of the Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) currently being negotiated between the EU
and Ukraine. The EU wants certain rules already implemented in Ukrainian
legislation (following inter alia Ukraine’s membership in the Energy
Community) to be included also in the DCFTA, including the conditions
of access to deposits and the transit, transportation and pricing rules.
The DCFTA would thus become an essential instrument in bilateral ener-
gy relations: the energy trade would be subject to a broader legally bind-
ing framework, and a formal basis for bilateral energy-related dispute
settlement would be formed.
The EU’s energy policy towards Ukraine has not thus far succeeded in
the full realisation of any of the EU’s two fundamental objectives. Work
on them is still in progress, though, although with a varying degree of
intensity, e.g. the intensity of involvement in transit issues is flagging.
The EU’s activities have brought many specific results. One of the relatively
recent, concrete results is the partial implementation of the EU directive
liberalising the gas market into Ukrainian legislation (July 2010), which
marks the beginning of a functional unbundling on the Ukrainian gas
market, followed by the decision to raise gas prices (summer 2010). At
the same time the future of the implementation of EU liberalisation di-
rectives in the Ukrainian market remains uncertain. The problems may
occur not only in the case of the gas sector (here inter alia due to the con-
ditions of contracts for gas supplies) but also the electricity sector (no
actual plans for reform of this sector or the implementation of EU envi-
ronmental norms to power generation)82. Furthermore, the Energy Com-
munity has no formal instruments enabling it to enforce commitments
made by its member states and Ukraine’s is not presently particularly
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Community Agreement see: Andriy Chubyk, Ukraine and the Energy Community, EaP
Community http://www.easternpartnership.org/
eager to legally bind itself on matters related to energy sector; this may
be seen in the context of the DCFTA energy chapter negotiations83.
There are several further challenges to the EU’s effectiveness. The ongo-
ing implementation of new European infrastructural projects84 and a de-
creased demand in recent years for Russian gas in Europe have resulted
in a gradual decrease of Ukraine’s transit significance for the EU. In this
context the EU’s policy related to transit (mainly towards Ukraine) re-
mains largely reactive. There is no real discussion concerning the impact
of Ukraine’s diminishing transit role on the hierarchy of the EU energy
objectives (or, more generally, those of EU foreign policy) in Ukraine or
the directions and possibilities of EU activities. The lack of clearly de-
fined specific interests from the EU behind the push for the reform and
the integration of the Ukrainian market with the EU’s constitutes yet
another crucial problem. The identification and formulation of these kinds
of interests would focus the EU’s actions and resources and enable the
achievement of more concrete results. Nor is it clear to what extent the
EU is trying to reach some convergence of its energy objectives (even on
the most general level) with Kyiv’s strategic and short-term goals. In par-
ticular, modifications in the latter, being e.g. the result of a difficult eco-
nomic situation or political shifts, could influence EU capabilities. Additio-
nally, Moscow’s foreign energy policy is an important factor influencing
the effectiveness of Brussels’ energy policy. The contradictions in the EU’s
and Russia’s visions of the development of the Ukrainian energy sector
(in both its internal and external dimensions) are visible. In particular,
the liberalisation of the Ukrainian electricity and gas markets envisaged
by the EU and their integration with the EU’s is contrary to Russia’s
interests (see above).
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83 Despite the fact that the negotiations about the energy system, launched in 2008, were
completed in October 2010 Ukraine declared it was willing to renegotiate part of the
agreed points.
84 The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, the Southern Energy Corridor and
South Stream projects, the implementation of BTS-2.
4. The Southern Corridor
The Southern Corridor is an example of what is probably the most com-
plicated EU energy infrastructure project in recent years. It has simulta-
neously been considered, as confirmed by subsequent EU documents85,
as the key project to the EU’s external energy policy and the policy on
the security of supplies. The Southern Corridor represents an ambitious
concept for establishing the fourth – after those in Russia, Norway and
Algeria – corridor for gas supplies from the Caspian region, the Middle
East and North Africa via Turkey and/or the Black Sea to Europe. The cor-
ridor would consist of multiple pipelines which already exist (such as
BTE), are under construction (as with the partially built Trans-Arab Gas
Pipeline or ITGI) or are planned (as with Nabucco, TAP), and possibly also
the LNG/CNG infrastructure.
Launching a new corridor and new gas supplies would enable a counter-
balancing for falling internal production in Europe. At the same time,
the project aims at diversification of both the sources and routes of sup-
plies, above all to the Balkan and Central European states that are heavily
dependent on a single supplier, and at enhancing competition on the Eu-
ropean gas market. Thus the creation of the Southern Corridor would in
fact contribute to limiting the import dependency on Russian gas supplies.
Finally, one of the original ideas behind this concept was to establish
infrastructure connecting Europe with the country which possesses the
world’s second largest gas deposits – Iran. This will allow the launching
of Iranian gas imports as soon as favourable circumstances arise.
The EU has been giving its political support to the Southern Corridor and
its projects. Although it has not officially determined the infrastructure
priorities within the concept, particular support for Nabucco is visible as
this project is regarded as having the potential to realise the core objec-
tives of the Southern Corridor. Political support from the EU’s institu-
tions has been manifested by: a) explicit formal backing visible inter alia
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85 See the key energy policy of the European Commission, e.g. strategy Energy 2020 or
the Second Strategic Energy Review.
in the clear statement of the strategic importance of the corridor in the
key documents related to the EU’s energy policy (e.g. strategy Energy 2020
and the infrastructure package of late 2010 where the Southern Corridor
is listed as the first of the EU’s gas infrastructure priorities); b) promotion
and lobbying for the project outside the EU, including in relations with
key producers (best exemplified by the early 2011 visit of EC President
Jose Manuel Barroso and the Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger in
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan); c) the EU’s involvement in facilitating the
negotiations of third countries/parties related to the key issues for the
implementation of the corridor (including negotiations with Turkey on
the gas transit conditions or Azeri-Turkmen negotiations concerning the
division of disputed gas deposits on the Caspian Sea shelf). Recently, in
parallel to the political backing, the EU has been intensifying its efforts
to support the project at administrative, financial and technology levels86.
Some examples of this support are: financial support for Nabucco and ITGI
funded in the European Energy Recovery Plan framework87; granting par-
tial exemptions from the TPA rule for Nabucco and ITGI88; plans for more
efficient administrative measures and the establishment of a new finan-
cial instrument enabling the EU to co-fund selected energy infrastructure
envisaged in the EC proposals included in the 2010 infrastructure pack-
age89; and finally, the project to create the Caspian Development Corpo-
ration (CDC) – a platform for joint European purchases of Caspian gas
(mainly from Turkmenistan) thus increasing the EU’s credibility and bar-
gaining power in relations with regional producers.
The Southern Corridor and its evolution provide a good illustration of the
process of developing the EU’s energy policy and its external dimension.
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86 Financial and technological support was announced in the Declaration on the Southern
Corridor of the 2009 summit in Prague.
87 Altogether EUR 300 million, of which two thirds for Nabucco. Earlier, the projects of
Southern Corridor received TEN-E grants of up to several million euros.
88 In fact the Poseidon project that is part of ITGI.
89 Earlier forms of support consisted inter alia of granting under TEN-E the status of pro-
ject of pan-European interests or appointing a special coordinator primarily to Nabucco
and then the whole Southern Corridor, whose main tasks were project promotion and
the facilitation of its implementation (the idea was not successful).
The concept of the Southern Corridor itself can be regarded as a specific
example of an instrument created by the EU to realise a specific objective.
As such it may be treated as a ‘test-case’ of the current capacities and
limitations of EU policy in reference to a specific project and goal.
Until now (May 2011) the EU and all other sides engaged have not only
failed to launch the Caspian/Middle Eastern gas export corridor but also
failed to succeed in ensuring its construction in the future. None of the
Southern Corridor projects have unambiguous guarantees of gas supplies
– supply contracts have not been signed90 and there are no concrete com-
mitments from exporters. And although exports of Azeri gas to Europe
are highly probable91, its volumes are not sufficient to determine the fu-
ture of the whole project. Securing at least one more gas sourcing is nece-
ssary for the implementation of the Southern Corridor. Several issues re-
lated to gas transit remain unresolved. There is no full clarity over the
terms of transit through Turkey (e.g. final agreement with Azerbaijan is
still pending), nor has it been determined how the Turkmen gas could
reach the Southern Corridor and Europe and what the feasible options
are for gas transmission from Iraq or Iran. Additionally the demand for
gas from the Southern Corridor is not certain due to lowered demand, the
greater availability of LNG, contracts for Russian gas supplies signed by
companies from Central Europe and the Balkans, and competition from
Russian infrastructure projects (South Stream). EU internal competition
rules may also present a certain challenge as they may happen to consti-
tute barriers for new suppliers entering the market, to decrease the new
route’s construction profitability (e.g. TPA rules), and to limit the imple-
mentation of innovative solutions (e.g. it is not quite clear whether the
CDC idea is consistent with EU competition law92). The realisation of the
Southern Corridor is also undoubtedly hampered by the multitude of par-
ties involved (states, companies etc.), the differing, and often difficult to
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an Iranian company, its feasibility in the current political circumstances is questionable.
91 Contracts for the export of Azeri gas are set to be signed in the coming months of 2011.
92 See e.g. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB4000142405274870460850457620847014
6252788.html?mod=djemITPE_h
reconcile, interests of those parties and the difficulties stemming from that
in defining common priorities and the coordination of action. This creates
the field for the EU acting as a coordinator determining immediate-, short-
and long-term priorities, facilitating talks between different actors and
working on at least the convergence of partial interests. However, the
EU’s role and mandate are not clearly defined due to internal factors and
the varying Member States’ attitudes, also with regard to infrastructure
priorities, and the optimal forms of supporting them93.
At the same time there have been some achievements related to the South-
ern Corridor. Along with the EU’s noticeable strengthening of its insti-
tutional commitment to the project, the interest and intensified activity
of several Member States is visible which might be illustrated by last
year’s visit by Chancellor Angela Merkel in the Caspian region or, among
others, Bulgarian and Italian talks about Caspian gas imports. In 2010
a basic gas agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey was reached94,
whose implementation would enable European companies to conclude
contracts for the supply of Azeri gas.
Finally, as the implementation of all current Southern Corridor projects is
not feasible, discussions concerning the possible merger of two of them
(probably ITGI being the most advanced in realisation and Nabucco which
corresponds best to the EU’s priorities) have started, probably with the
EU’s informal backing. That could lead to moving the Southern Corridor
forward, also by the possibility of the development of a de facto new Cas-
pian and Middle Eastern gas export project which would better fit the
current conditions, respond to the parties’ expectations and be suited to
the realisation of at least some of the priority objectives of the Southern
Corridor. Additionally, independently of the EU’s or Member States’
activities, the developments of recent months (the conflicts in North Africa
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is in competition with the Southern Corridor; other EU countries are opposed to the EU's
strong engagement in the Southern Corridor and/or disapprove of the creation of a new
financial instrument etc.
94 Final agreement defining inter alia the terms of gas transit is still to be reached and
the negotiations are to continue (next round in late May 2011).
and the instability in the Middle East) increase the attractiveness of
Caspian energy resources and may constitute a factor encouraging inten-
sified efforts related to the Southern Corridor.
5. The EU energy policy towards North African states
The North African countries are essential partners for the EU in the ener-
gy field. In 2009 nearly 20% of the EU’s natural gas imports came from
North Africa (three quarters of that from Algeria) and approximately 13%
of the oil imports (the majority from Libya)95. North African countries are
also encompassed by the EU neighbourhood policy. Their importance for
the EU energy market and the security of the energy supply is particu-
larly visible in the light of the current political crisis in the region. The
dynamics of changes and the lack of clear-cut prospects for a sustainable
stabilisation of the political situation make it impossible to currently de-
velop the strategic and long-term solutions. The changes also bring into
question the adequacy of the recent ideas on a modification of the EU
energy policy towards particular North African countries and the region
as a whole.
The EU energy policy’s aims with regard to North African countries are
to a large extent convergent with the overall energy objectives the EU has
set for producing and neighbouring countries. On the one hand, there is
currently a particularly relevant need to increase security and the sustain-
ability of energy supplies. On the other hand, the EU is seeking to encou-
rage reforms on regional energy markets in order to harmonise, and even-
tually to integrate them with the EU market and to promote the EU’s
internal standards. The EU aims equally to accelerate the implementation
of infrastructure projects that serve the interests of both parties (includ-
ing the Arab Gas Pipeline, MEDGAZ and GALSI, electricity interconnections
with the EU including the completion of MedRing, the development of
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95 Sources: the EC, EU Market Observatory and Eurostat.
alternative energy sources, particularly solar power through the Medi-
terranean Solar Plan (which envisages the production of solar energy in
the Sahara desert and the construction of suitable interconnections allow-
ing the import of this energy)96 and non-conventional sources of oil and
gas97.
The EU has not developed a regional energy policy oriented exclusively
towards North African countries. Collaboration with this region has con-
stituted part of a wider framework of the EU’s policy towards the Medi-
terranean region (including some of the Middle Eastern countries).
Furthermore, Libya has so far remained to a large extent outside the for-
mal framework of EU policy. Brussels launched dialogue with Tripoli in
2004 and since 2008 has been holding talks on the association agree-
ment which has not been completed. In parallel, bilateral relations with
particular Member States, especially Italy, Spain and Germany, played
a much more important role than co-operation with the EU. The outbreak of
the civil war in Libya in 2011 has halted any energy dialogue with the EU.
EU–North African energy relations have been above all pursued in multi-
lateral platforms (EUROMED) and, to a lesser extent, in bilateral co-opera-
tion98. Energy issues have been incorporated to a substantial degree into
a larger framework of economic co-operation in which the EU is now seek-
ing to establish a free trade area. The key role in EU policy towards North
Africa, also in the energy field, has been played by the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership of 1995 (EUROMED, i.e. the Barcelona Process), whose mecha-
nisms are used in current initiatives: the EU Neighbourhood Policy; and
above all, the Union for the Mediterranean of 2008.
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96 The objectives according to the EUROMED Energy Action Plan 2008–2013 adopted in
Limasol in 2007 and supplemented by the Union for the Mediterranean summit in 2008.
97 Exploring the potential – mainly in Morocco and Tunisia, searching for the possibilities
of oil shale extraction is one of the pillars of co-operation under MED-EMIP (Euro Medi-
terranean Energy Market Integration Project).
98 It is illustrated inter alia by the fact that energy issues are to a small extent reflected
in Action Plans signed by the EU with specific countries from the region.
Within EUROMED, the EUROMED Energy Partnership99 was established
and it is aimed, inter alia, at defining and modifying the objectives of EU’s
energy policy towards the region and the implementation of the policy.
This partnership remains the basic and actually the only EU-North African
energy co-operation platform. Key projects of this partnership can be co-
funded by EU financial instruments. EIB funding under the Euro-Medi-
terranean Investment and Partnership Facility has appeared to be the
most productive form of financial support100. Funds from the European
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, the InfraMed Infrastructure Fund101, are
equally available. The EU and North Africa’s “projects of common interest”
(e.g. the Arab Gas Pipeline) have also been financed under the European
Energy Recovery Plan.
The most tangible effects of the EU energy policy in North Africa can be
seen at the infrastructure level – the already implemented and planned
gas and electricity interconnections with the region. The EU is actively
financially supporting “projects of common interest”. For instance the
EIB102 co-funded the construction of LNG terminals and power plants in
Egypt, and several gas pipelines (e.g. in Tunisia, the one linking Egypt
and Jordan and the TransMed gas pipeline Algeria–Tunisia–Spain). How-
ever, despite ongoing work, the key electricity project, MedRing, has not
been completed yet and the intraregional interconnections remain insuf-
ficient.
Financial support is also visible in the case of the development of alter-
native energy resources, which has recently become a priority of the EU’s
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99 Within EUROMED have been set up among others: the EUROMED Ministerial Con-
ference on Energy, the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP) and the Medi-
terranean Working Group on Electricity and Natural Gas Regulation.
100 In 2001–2007 approximately EUR 2 billion were allocated to the projects of the Energy
Partnership (mainly gas and electricity interconnections), whereas direct funding under
another instrument in the same period, MEDA, reached EUR 55 million.
101 Established in 2010 by French Caisse des Dépôts, Moroccan Caisse de Dépôt et de
Gestion, Egyptian EFG Hermes, Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and the EIB.
102 The value of the EIB's funding allocated to the energy sector of EUROMED countries
amounted to EUR 3.7 billion in 2002–2009.
engagement in the region. The EIB co-finances, among other initiatives,
the Mediterranean Solar Plan103. At the same time, the effectiveness of EU
activities related to the development of solar power generation is limited.
Although North African countries show interest in increasing their solar
energy potential and securing EU funds for this purpose, they are not
ready to subsidise this sector themselves e.g. by creating legal regulations
modelled on EU solutions. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the objecti-
ves of the EU and the countries from the region are convergent in this
area. The EU is largely interested in enabling power generation mainly
for export (to the EU), whereas North African countries need electricity
mostly for internal use, particularly in the context of rapidly growing
regional consumption104 and the still poor electrification of some areas.
Energy co-operation between the EU and North Africa, including finan-
cial support for specific projects, contributes to the systematically grow-
ing involvement of European companies in the region. This facilitates
the functioning of those already present and attracts new investments
(e.g. to the Desertec Industrial Initiative).
The least effective remains the EU policy of reforming regional energy
markets, realised mainly by exporting the EU’s internal electricity and
gas market regulations. Particularly visible in relations with Algeria and
Egypt, it is caused inter alia by weaknesses of EU solutions. North African
countries regard EU market regulations as excessive, and point to cases
where the EU Member States themselves challenge some of the EU’s in-
ternal rules105.
A relative weakness in the EU policy oriented towards North Africa was
the lack of a cohesive and comprehensive political and economic offer.
The effectiveness of the EU’s activities was further undermined by the
fact that a part of Member States was engaged in intensive bilateral
energy co-operation with particular North African countries.
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103 http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/femip_energy_en.pdf
104 See e.g. the presentation Electricity interconnection project between North Africa and
Europe: Challenges and opportunities, M. Benini, A. L’Abbate, RSE SpA, Italy, SECURE
Regional Stakeholders Meeting, Cairo 2010.
105 For instance Germany's opposition to full ownership unbundling.
Although energy relations with the region can mostly be positively eval-
uated, it is not clear to what extent the concrete successes in the energy
sphere can be directly attributed to EU activities. Many link them rather
to market forces, geographical proximity, the attractiveness of the EU
market106 and the historical and political context. This latter seems to be
indicated by the lack of sufficient instruments of influence that Brussels
could use in the region (manifested in the acceptance of authoritarian
regimes and the abandonment of the otherwise used principle of condi-
tionality); and the attitude of scepticism towards the EU and its solutions
regarding the energy market displayed by particular North African coun-
tries (especially Algeria and Egypt). This would mean in fact negligible
possibilities for the EU to shape its bilateral energy relations, to promote
its objectives and to influence the mode of involvement for particular EU
countries and European companies in North Africa.
A substantial setback for the EU’s energy policy has been the lack of under-
standing for or the failure to take into consideration the needs of its
partners from the region. This may be proven by the rather complicated
EU-Algerian relations and in fact by the EU’s withdrawal from the strate-
gic energy partnership proposed by Algeria due to completely different
visions of its objectives and formula (the EU wanted a harmonisation of
legislation, whereas Algeria expected a comprehensive partnership agree-
ment107). Another example is the above mentioned misunderstanding of
regional needs in the case of the EU’s priority projects for the develop-
ment of solar energy.
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106 See e.g. Energising EU-Algerian relations, Hakim Darbouche, Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies in: The Maghreb Center Journal, Issue 1, 2010.
107 Algeria offered the EU such a partnership after the first Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis
in 2006, for more information see H. Darbouche, op. cit. Strategic energy partnership is
presently again on the table – see e.g. http://www.elmoudjahid.com/en/actualites/781
Main conclusions
1. The EU’s external energy policy is undergoing the process of being
defined. Its emergence and eventual shape are not determined yet, in
part due to the fact that there are many stakeholders involved in the pro-
cess (the EU institutions, Member States and energy companies) whose
interests are not always convergent.
2. Predictability and prices still determine the attractiveness of the EU ener-
gy market for supplier countries despite growing competition from the
emerging economies, particularly China and India. In order to fully ex-
ploit this asset in relations with producers and to secure the best possi-
ble terms and conditions of supply, a greater consolidation of the EU
market and a coordination of the activities of particular actors, both in-
ternally and externally, is necessary.
3. The EU’s energy market acquis appears as one of the most important
and efficient instruments of influence with regard to energy exporters
and investors from third countries. Among the benefits brought about
by the application of EU rules is a gradual removal of destination clauses
from contracts for the supply of gas.
4. The EU’s external energy policy has two main objectives. The first one
is to ensure a sustainable, stable and cost-effective energy supply. The
second is to promote energy market integration and regulatory conver-
gence with neighbouring countries (often but not always this supports
the achievement of the first objective). However, in order to improve its
effectiveness, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be seen in a broad-
er economic and political context.
5. The promotion of energy market integration and regulatory convergence
in Europe’s neighbourhood depend on the nature of the relationship
with third countries. In realising this objective the EU was most success-
ful with candidate countries (in the Western Balkans through the Energy
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Community) where the successes were connected with the incorpora-
tion of energy acquis into the accession process. The effectiveness of
such measures towards non-accession countries is, however, not certain.
Energy dialog needs to be accompanied with an attractive political and
economic offer.
6. The Arab spring of 2011 offers a unique opportunity to for the EU to
reassess and adjust its policy towards European neighbours. In the con-
text of the communication on the new European Neighbourhood Policy
presented on May 25, 2011, energy will remain one of the key areas of
cooperation and at the same time a litmus test for EU’s ability to build
genuine partnerships in the neighbourhood.
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1. EU energy mix
APPENDIX
Sources: Eurostat; European Commission, EU Energy Trends to 2030; 2009 update,
Reference Scenario
* WEO, new Policies Scenario
Sources: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010; IEA, Natural Gas Information; European
Commission, EU Energy Trends to 2030; 2009 update; BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2010
2. Dynamics of demand for energy resources of EU and other
major global energy consumers (2005–2030)
a. Dynamics of natural gas demand
20302009
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* WEO 2010, new Policies Scenario
Sources: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010; European Commission, EU Energy
Trends to 2030; 2009 update; BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010
* WEO 2010, new Policies Scenario
Sources: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010; IEA, Coal Information; European Com-
mission, EU Energy Trends to 2030; 2009 update; BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2010
b. Dynamics of oil demand
c. Dynamics of coal demand
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* WEO 2010, new Policies Scenario
Sources: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010; European Commission, EU Energy Trends
to 2030; 2009 update; BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010
d. Dynamics of demand for nuclear energy
3. EU and other major energy resources importers, 2009
Sources: IEA
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Sources: IEA
4. EU import dependence
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b) Oil supply sources, 2010 (%)
Sources: EC, DG Energy, Market Observatory, Oil
(ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil)
c) Coal* supply sources, 2009 (%)
* Hard coal (99% of lignite consumed in EU is satisfied by domestic production)
Source: EC, DG Energy
5. EU energy supply sources
a) Natural gas supply sources, 2009 (%)
Sources: Eurostat (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/)
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d) Uranium supply sources, 2009 (%)
Sources: Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2009
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6. Major global oil producers in 2009 and 2030
Sources: BP Statistical review of world energy 2010 (for 2009); IEA WEO 2010
(New Policies Scenario for 2030 forecasts)
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7. Major global natural gas producers in 2009 and 2030
Sources: BP Statistical review of world energy 2010 (for 2009); IEA WEO 2010
(New Policies Scenario for 2030 forecasts)
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8. Major global coal producers in 2009 and 2030
Sources: BP Statistical review of world energy 2010 (for 2009); IEA WEO 2010
(New Policies Scenario for 2030 forecasts)
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